Vietnow

Brendan Boyd

In the last few weeks, the Bush administration has been under fire regarding management of the war in Iraq. Many critics are accusing the administration of lying to the public — the administration is saying that the war will soon be over while new reports of American casualties come in. Even the story from U.S. officials is mixed. Some claim the insurgency is fizzling out, while others state it is stronger than ever. The approval rating of George Bush and support for the war are as low as they have ever been. Many Democrats, and even some Republicans, are pressuring the military to set a firm date for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq. Critics are accusing the Bush administration of leading the country into a quagmire, and whispers of a second Vietnam are being heard around every corner.

This begs the question, how could America get involved in another seemingly endless war characterized by urban violence and guerrilla tactics? It is unfair to place the blame solely on the president and his supporters. A Michael Mooretype conspiracy theory, while shedding light on many concerns, is not entirely accurate. There is, and defi- nitely was, support for this war in America. In addition, the American people have not been collectively brainwashed by an evil hybrid media- government monster (possibly in the form of a giant FOX).

The answer is that average citizens, military specialists and politicians were all reassured by the overwhelming success of the first Gulf War. The victory was so complete that it is hard to believe another war in the same place would be so difficult to win. Also, after the first Gulf War there was talk of a revolution in military technology. Some asserted the information revolution had ushered in new weapons and tactics that made it possible for the U.S. to fight and win a small guerrilla- style conflict.

It is clear that the U.S. is not able to bring a swift end to the confl ict in Iraq. Despite its superior technology and numbers, violence continues. The war is becoming more and more reminiscent of Vietnam. This should come as no surprise because the U.S. is making the same mistakes it made four decades ago. Regardless of new tactics or technology, similar factors exist that make it nearly impossible for the U.S. to win a limited conflict and change the government of a country.

Just as they did in Vietnam, the U.S. has underestimated the will of the Iraqi people to resist American forces and culture. U.S. troops were not welcomed with open arms, and the Iraqi people have not condemned the insurgents. In the first Gulf War, many troops were fighting against their will for Saddam Hussein, outside their national borders. The stories of Iraqi soldiers surrendering and welcoming Western forces are a fading memory compared to the anger and hatred that exists today.

The U.S. government has also overestimated the resilience of the American people. When it became apparent the conflict would be a long, drawn-out aff air with troops dying regularly, support for the war quickly diminished. Colonel Harry Summers Jr. listed this as one of the main problems in Vietnam in his book On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War.

America is a democracy, and without public support the war is doomed to failure. Politicians have become more concerned with the political ramifications of the war than the war itself. Military leaders are handcuff ed, so to speak, and cannot carry out a campaign free from political intervention. In Iraq today, the fear of losing the average American’s blessing is preventing the American military from invoking all of its might.

Summers also states that the American people must believe war is being fought for a “just” cause in order to support it. The American people originally believed this war to be “just” because of the oppressive dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and his possession of weapons of mass destruction. With the dictator behind bars and weapons of mass destruction nowhere to be found, the alleged virtue of the war has dissipated. The main similarity between the current war in Iraq and the Vietnam War is in their objectives. During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the goal was clearly defined: remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait. This allowed for a clear termination point and declaration of victory. In the current conflict, the goal of the war — as in Vietnam — is regime change. This is a much more complex goal. The mission has no clear route to victory because each situation is entirely diff erent, making it difficult to draw on past experience.

Also, the basic time frame is longer than simply removing hostile troops. Including post-conflict reconstruction and setting up a Western-style democratic government, the mission in Iraq will take decades. At the outset of the war, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld intimated that the war could be over in a matter of weeks. This claim, however, was formulated using the first Gulf War as a template.

Regardless of the moral questions about whether it should be involved in changing the regimes of foreign countries, the United States is continually involved in wars that it cannot win. The lessons of Vietnam appear to weigh so heavily on the U.S. that it is difficult to comprehend how some can forget them when they matter the most.

Brendan Boyd has a master’s degree in strategic studies.